Using a Dummy Corporate Borrower Creates usury and Tax Difficulties by Portman, Glenn A.
SMU Law Review
Volume 28
Issue 1 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 19
1974
Using a Dummy Corporate Borrower Creates
usury and Tax Difficulties
Glenn A. Portman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Glenn A. Portman, Using a Dummy Corporate Borrower Creates usury and Tax Difficulties, 28 Sw L.J. 437 (1974)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol28/iss1/19
USING A "DUMMY" CORPORATE BORROWER
CREATES USURY AND TAX DIFFICULTIES
by Glenn A. Portman
Since the late 1960's the American economy has experienced a tight
money market during which the pressures exerted by inflation have steadily
increased the interest rate. Many businessmen have found that in this tight
money market state usury laws' which set low ceilings upon the maximum
interest rate which lenders may legally charge individual borrowers have the
effect of preventing them from financing their ventures. The businessman
operating in a non-corporate form is thus confronted with a dilemma when-
ever a tight money market dictates that lenders will not make commercial
loans to individuals. For corporate borrowers Texas 2 and many other states3
have statutes which deny the defense of usury to corporations. If the busi-
nessman forms a corporation to utilize such a corporate exception statute,
the corporation will probably be able to attract a willing lender due to the
higher interest rate which may legally be charged. But a prevailing question
has been whether the courts will sanction a lender's requiring a borrower
to incorporate as a condition for a commercial loan.
Businessmen who have chosen to operate their commercial enterprises in
non-corporate forms have frequently operated as partnerships or sole propri-
etorships because of the tax treatment available to such entities. This has
been especially true of real estate ventures. If a corporation is interposed
between businessmen and their business operations the corporation will be
recognized as a taxable entity, with the consequence that the conduit tax
treatment available to partnerships will be denied the incorporated business-
man. The device of a corporate agent being employed to serve both the
purpose of borrowing money and retaining the advantages of conduit tax
treatment has thus evolved. 4  However, requirements and vague standards
1. See, e.g., 19C FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.02 (1966) (maximum permissible rate
of 10%); 5 MD. ANN. CODE art. 49, § 3 (Supp. 1973) (maximum permissible rate
under written contract of 8%); N.J. REV. STAT. § 31:1-1 (Supp. 1973) (maximum rate
varies between 6% and 8% as set by regulation of the commissioner of banking);
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501 (McKinney Supp. 1973) (maximum rate of 6%
unless otherwise prescribed by the banking board); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
5069-1.02 (1971) (maximum rate of 10%).
2. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Supp. 1974). This statute by
its terms denies corporations, their successors, guarantors, and assigns the defense of
usury for loans exceeding a principal amount of $5,000. However, a maximum rate
of 1 % per month or 18% per year is imposed so that corporations can assert the
usury defense if they are charged interest which exceeds the maximum limit.
3. See, e.g., 19C FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.02 (1966) (maximum interest rate of
15% imposed upon loans to corporations); GA. CODE ANN. § 57-118 (1971) (corpora-
tions organized for pecuniary gain may agree in writing to any interest rate for loans
exceeding the principal amount of $2,500); 2B MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 125 (1973)(no maximum rate for corporations), N.J. REv. STAT. § 31:1-6 (1963) (no maximum
rate imposed); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-521 (McKinney 1964); WASH. REV. CODE
A. § 19.52.080 (Supp. 1972) (loans over $100,000).
4. See Kurtz & Kopp, Taxability of Straw Corporations in Real Estate Transac-
lions, 22 TAX LAw. 647 (1969); Tilley, Dummy Corporations for Real Estate Holding
Purposes Taxation and Technique, 33 TEX. B.J. 445 (1970).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
promulgated by the courts have left the feasibility of such an agency con-
ceptual approach open to question. The scope of this Comment is to discuss
the interpretation of state statutes which deny the defense of usury to cor-
porations, and to compare the approaches taken by state courts to solve the
problems created by lenders or borrowers who deliberately rely upon the
exception statute to avoid general usury restrictions on interest for loans to
individuals. Also discussed are the tax problems created by the formation
of a corporation to satisfy state laws exempting corporations from the usury
laws.
I. A SHORT REVIEW OF USURY
From early time, attempts have been made to regulate charges for the
use of money through controlled interest rates.5 The antagonism of the
Judao-Christian heritage to the exaction of usury, the taking of too great
a charge for the use of money, is founded in Biblical tradition, a tradition
carried into the Middle Ages, when religious considerations were given great
weight and Biblical prohibitions against usury taken literally.6 This attitude
of medieval men towards charges for the use of money did not, however,
long survive the rise of the modern commercial and industrial nations. As
the industrial state evolved, enterprising men, motivated by the pursuit of
profits and a higher standard of living, found the use of interest and credit
powerful economic tools in the development of a stable economy. Perhaps
unfortunately, the American colonies adopted the English pattern and en-
acted usury statutes regulating interest rates at a time prior to the wide-
spread commercial use of interest and credit in the major financial markets. 7
European nations,8 commencing with England9 in 1854, departed from the
historical pattern and repealed their general usury laws, so that for over a
century European nations have proceeded upon the theory that money and
interest rates are subject to market fluctuations caused by the economic laws
of supply and demand within the money markets. 10 The retention of usury
5. See Benfield, Money, Mortgages, and Migraine-The Usury Headache, 19
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 819, 822-23 (1968). Professor Benfield points out that the use
of credit transactions probably commenced about the time of the first loan and that
as a consequence primitive societies attempted to regulate the amount of interest
charged to borrowers by imposing a maximum ceiling on the interest rate. Both the
Code of Hammurabi and Roman law imposed legal restrictions upon the interest rate,
although there is considerable evidence that the legal restrictions were frequently vio-
lated. Id.
6. See Comment, Usury Laws and the Corporate Exception, 23 MD. L. REV. 51,
52 (1963).
7. Id. at 51-53.
8. See Merriman & Hanks, Revising State Usury Statutes in Light of a Tight
Money Market, 27 MD. L. REV. 1, 8 (1967).
9. Usury Law Repeal Act, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 90 (1854). See also Merriman &
Hanks, supra note 8, at 17, where the authors explained that the present English system
for controlling the taking of excess interest is to empower equity courts by the Money-
lenders Act of 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 51 § 1(1), to set aside interest charges which
are unconscionable.
10. Professor Benfield has denominated four factors which determine the market
rate of interest for a loan. The four factors are: (1) the cost of money as reflected
by the prime interest rate, (2) the cost to the lender of administering the loan, (3)
the risk assumed by the lender because of the possibility that the borrower may default,




laws in the United States has been cogently criticized as ignoring the reali-
ties of a functioning money market." The primary reason for the retention
of usury laws in America seems to be the favorable attitude which persons
unfamiliar with the financial markets exhibit towards the concept of usury
penalties. This attitude is attributable to the fact that the usury laws are
commonly associated with the protection of the small consumer-borrower. 12
Coverage and Elements of Modern Usury Statutes. The impression that
the usury laws protect consumer-borrowers is in large part illusory. It has
been estimated that less than half of the borrowing in the United States falls
within the coverage of the usury laws due to statutory exceptions which per-
mit loans at higher interest rates for specified purposes.13 The exceptions
from the general usury laws which permit the charging of a higher rate of
interest include small consumer loans, time-price sales, installment loans, and
industrial loans, most of which directly affect the consumer rather than the
commercial borrower. 14  In fact, the exceptions to the general usury law
have so eroded the sanction of usury that only home mortgages and some
commercial lending remain within the ambit of the usury statutes. 15
Traditionally the offense of usury has been defined as consisting of the
following elements: (1) an agreement to lend money or money's worth, (2)
the borrower's obligation to repay absolutely and not contingently, (3) the
taking of a larger compensation for the loan than is permitted by the usury
statutes, and '(4) an intention to take usury.16 The modern usury statutes
embodying these elements seem to have either one of two goals. Either the
usury statute attempts to fix the price of money by dictating a very low in-
terest ceiling, six percent being the least, or else the statute is designed to
set a maximum limit for conscionable loans. 17
II. THE CORPORATE EXCEPTION TO THE USURY LAWS
The corporate exception to the usury law has evolved from the policy
judgments of many legislatures that corporations should not be entitled to
plead the defense of usury. The first enactment denying the defense of
usury to a corporation, specifically the Bank of England, was passed by Par-
liament in 1716.18 The American experience with statutes denying the de-
ll. Id. at 820. Benfield argues that state governments do not attempt to fix the
price of goods and by analogy there is no reason to regulate the money market by fix-
ing the price of credit through the device of controlling the interest rate; such regula-
tion is said to ignore the economic functioning of the money market, which is anal-
ogous to the functioning of the commodity markets.
12. Id. at 821. Although Professor Benfield favors the repeal of state usury laws
in the commercial lending situation, he would substitute legislation for the specific pro-
tection of consumer and small business borrowers in the form of the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code. Id. at 820-21.
13. Id. at 820-22.
14. Id. at 835-51. See, e.g., TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-1.01 to -51.19(Supp. 1974) (the Texas Consumer Credit Code).
15. See Benfield, supra note 5, at 840-43, 852-58.
16. See Pearce & Williams, Punitive Past to Current Convenience-A Study of the
Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 236-37 (1968).
17. See Benfield, supra note 5, at 831-33.




fense of usury to corporations commenced in 1850 with a New York stat-
ute.19 The passage of this New York statute was the direct result of the
decision in Dry Dock Bank v. American Life Insurance & Trust Co.20 in
which the judicial enforcement of the usury law enabled a New York bank-
ing corporation to avoid $250,000 of its obligations. The commercial and
business community convinced the Legislature of New York to respond in
that same year with a statute denying the defense of usury to corporations. 2'
The rationale for denying the defense of usury to corporations is that, un-
like the situation between lender and the consumer oriented "necessitous"
borrower whose borrowing is motivated by the need for life's essentials, the
corporation may negotiate loans from the standpoint of an equal to the
lender and, therefore, does not need the special protection of usury laws.22
The fact that corporate borrowing is for corporate purposes and that the risk
of loss is distributed among stockholders protected by limited liability may
also partly explain the rationale for the corporate exception statutes; loss
occasioned by the payment of usurious interest would not have the direct
effect on a stockholder that it would have upon an individual borrower.2 3
Also, there is an understandable impression that economic growth is encour-
aged by permitting corporations freer access to financing, since lenders will
be more willing to risk their money with the incentive of a higher rate of
return.
Judicial interpretation of the corporate exception statutes has tended to
be liberal, the corporate exception being viewed as a return to the situation
at common law where there was no usury offense. The corporate excep-
tion statutes have been broadly applied not only to deny corporations the
usury defense but also to prevent affirmative or equitable actions by corpo-
rations against lenders based upon allegations of usury. 24 A more crucial
question is whether the corporate exception statute repeals the usury law
as to corporations or merely denies them the usury defense. The conse-
quence of interpreting the statute as repealing the usury law as to corpora-
tions is to deny the defense of usury to persons collaterally liable on corpo-
rate obligations. Although early cases interpreted the statute as merely re-
moving the defense of usury from the corporation and permitting collater-
19. Act of 1850, ch. 172, §§ 1, 2, as amended, N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-521
(McKinney 1964).
20. 3 N.Y. 344 (Ct. App. 1850). In the Dry Dock Bank decision a banking cor-
poration was permitted to assert the usury defense against a lending institution which
had financed the bank enabling it to reopen after being placed in receivership.
21. See Benfield, supra note 5, at 847-48.
22. See Sparkman & McLean Co. v. Govan Inv. Trust, 78 Wash. 2d 584, 478 P.2d
232 (1971). The Supreme Court of Washington noted that the legislature in enacting
an exception statute to the usury laws could be justified in concluding that corporations
do not need the protection of the usury laws.
23. See Carozza v. Federal Fin. & Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 131 A. 332 (1925).
This reasoning, that corporate stockholders are protected by limited liability, does not
always hold true because lenders often require a personal guarantee or surety on the
loan. Such guarantors are secondarily liable on the corporation's obligations and, by
the majority rule, are also denied the usury defense along with the corporation.
24. See, e.g., Holland v. Gross, 89 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1956) (exception statute ap-
plies to any procedural position taken by the corporation); Pink Lady v. William Penn
Loan Co., 189 Pa. Super. 187, 150 A.2d 154 (1959) (corporation could not avoid the
exception statute by bringing an affirmative action in equity).
[Vol. 28
COMMENTS
ally liable persons to assert the usury defense,25 it is presently universally
accepted that all persons collaterally liable on corporate obligations are in-
cluded within the coverage of the corporate exception statutes. As a result,
the defense of usury is denied to individual guarantors, sureties, trustees in
bankruptcy, junior mortgagees, and the indorsers of corporate obligations. 26
Potential Usury Abuses Through Corporate Exception Statutes. In situa-
tions where astute businessmen incorporate and subsequently approach a
lending institution there is no conflict between usury laws and the corporate
exception statutes. The parties to such a loan may agree upon an interest
rate which is greater than that permissible for loans to individuals. Such
a transaction falls squarely within the letter and purposes of the corporate
exception statutes. However, during a tight money market when interest
rates are rising, the situation becomes more complicated when an individual
approaches a lender and agrees upon the formation of a corporation to cir-
cumvent the usury law by means of the corporate exception statute. In such
situations as when the individual who incorporated resists collection or fore-
closure, the courts must decide whether the loan was illegally made to an
individual borrower with a corporation merely interposed as a disguise, or
whether the loan was legally made to a corporation.
In several early cases the New York courts demonstrated a willingness
to pierce the corporate veil and find that the loan was in reality made to
an individual borrower. 27 But the great depression, starting with the 1929
crash in the stock market, marked a change in the attitude of the New York
courts. During the depression, when the great concern was supporting busi-
nesses, courts, as part of that effort, encouraged lenders to risk their funds
upon business ventures. One result was that the New York courts became
highly reluctant to pierce the corporate veil when a loan was made to a
corporation. The leading case in New York from the depression era is Jen-
kins v. Moyse,28 in which the New York Court of Appeals held that so long
25. See, e.g., Market Bank v. Smith, 16 F. Cas. 757 (No. 9090) (D. Wis. 1858)(accommodation indorsers not barred by exception statute from asserting usury de-
fense).
26. See, e.g., Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. McClellan, 422 F.2d 825 (5th
Cir. 1970) (surety on corporate obligation); Reynolds v. Service Loan & Fin. Co., 116
Ga. App. 740, 158 S.E.2d 309 (1967) (guarantor); Verson v. Hardt, 107 Ill. App. 2d
480, 246 N.E.2d 461 (1969) (surety); E'Town Shopping Center, Inc. v. Lexington Fin.
Co., 436 S.W.2d 267 (Ky. App. 1969) (endorser of corporate note); Reamer v. Kess-
ler, 233 Md. 311, 196 A.2d 896 (1964) (endorser); Penrose v. Canton Nat'l Bank,
147 Md. 200, 127 A. 852 (1952) (accommodation endorser); Pardee v. Fetter, 345
Mich. 548, 77 N.W.2d 124 (1956) (accommodation endorser); Snyder v. Woxo, Inc.,
185 Neb. 545, 177 N.W.2d 281 (1970) (individual secondarily liable); Ferdon v. Zar-
riello Bros., 87 N.J. Super. 124, 208 A.2d 186 (1965) (accommodation endorser).
27. See, e.g., Anam Realty Corp. v. Delancey Garage, Inc., 190 App. Div. 745,
180 N.Y.S. 297 (1923); First Nat'l Bank v. American Near East & Black Sea Line,
Inc., 119 Misc. 650, 197 N.Y.S. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Arona Holding Corp. v. West
Twenty-Fifth St. Realty Corp., 198 N.Y.S. 660 (City Ct. 1922). These cases examined
the use of the corporate exception statute from the standpoint of a question of fact
as to whether a loan had been made to an individual or to a corporation.
28. 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930). In Jenkins an individual borrower ap-
proached a lender for a loan and was refused, the lender stating that loans were only
available to corporations. Thus, the lender in Jenkins avoided the usury problem by
refusing a loan to an individual. This is, however, a mere formal distinction because
1974]
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as the lender did not make the loan to an individual, the lender could sug-
gest that a corporation be formed to borrow the needed funds. In speaking
to -the issue of whether allowing the borrower and lender deliberately to
utilize the corporate exception statute was circumventing the law, the court
stated that "[t]he [usury] law has not been evaded but has been followed
meticulously in order to accomplish a result which all parties desired and
which the law does not forbid. '29 Thus, the framework in New York for
the use of the corporate exception has evolved to permit the parties to deal
with each other in such a manner as to circumvent the effects of the usury
laws through the intentional use of the corporate exception statute. Later
New York cases have solidified the concept that a corporation may be de-
liberately formed for the sole purpose of avoiding the usury laws.30
While the corporate exception is premised upon an arm's-length bargain
resulting from a negotiated loan between lender and corporation, not all bor-
rowers who seek the advantage of the corporate exception are businessmen,
nor are they necessarily familiar with credit transactions. 31  The Legislature
of New York found it necessary to amend its corporate exception statute
in 1956 to reinstate the usury defense for corporations whose sole asset was
a one- or two-family dwelling upon which a mortgage had been executed
within six months of the corporation's organization. 32 The amendment was
deemed necessary since a number of lenders were requiring home owners
to incorporate in order to obtain home mortgage loans, thereby enabling the
lenders to exact high interest charges on the loan. 33 The fact that the legis-
lature found it necessary to amend the statute in New York further indicates
that the New York courts were permitting the parties to a loan deliberately
the lender need only refuse to loan money to the individual applicant and then suggest
incorporation so that the lender may loan to a corporation.
29. 172 N.E. at 522.
30. See, e.g., Leader v. Dinkier Management Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 393, 230 N.E.2d
120, 283 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1967); Sohmer Factors Corp. v. Tioga Drive Corp., 8 App.
Div. 2d 847, 190 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1959); Margulis v. Messinger, 34 Misc. 2d 699, 210
N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Mittman v. Kuo, 5 Misc. 2d 595, 160 N.Y.S.2d 743
(Sup. Ct. 1957).
The New York rule that the lender may suggest incorporation to the borrower has
been adopted in Maryland upon the basis of an estoppel theory which prevents the in-
corporating borrower from ignoring his own corporation. See Rabinowich v. Eleisberg,
159 Md. 655, 152 A. 437 (1930).
31. See Comment, Incorporation To Avoid the Usury Laws, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
1390, 1391 (1968). This Comment noted that it is relatively simple for anyone to
incorporate and that persons other than experienced businessmen may seek the advan-
tages of the exception statute. However, this article hypothesized that requiring bor-
rowers to incorporate for the benefit of the lender may be a feasible commercial prac-
tice.
32. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-521(2) (McKinney 1964).
33. See Note, The Corporate Device as a Cover for Usury-Amendment to New
York General Business Law Section 374--Corporations Prohibited from Interposing the
Defense of Usury, 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 715 (1956). This Note concluded that the
amendment did not offer sufficient protection to borrowers for the reason that its scope
was too narrow. Id. at 721.
The problem which this amendment attempted to correct still exists, for at least one
lender has circumvented the amendment with the probable cooperation of his borrower
by the mechanism of having the borrower personally guarantee the loan to the shell
corporation and secure the guarantee by a mortgage instead of transferring the borrow-
er's home to the corporation. See Brint v. Ellin Express Co., 51 Misc. 2d 796, 273
N.Y.S.2d 860 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd, 28 App. Div. 2d 825, 282 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1967).
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to circumvent the general usury laws through the corporate exception stat-
ute.
In New York, where the courts have followed the doctrine of Jenkins by
sanctioning the deliberate use of the corporate exception to avoid the effect
of the general usury law, one commentator has noted a trend in recent deci-
sions towards limiting .the availability of the corporate exception statute to
those situations where there is a business purpose for the loan.3 4 Certainly
when a business purpose for the borrower's seeking a loan is clear, there are
strong reasons for applying the corporate exception statute. A business pur-
pose in this context distinguishes between loans sought for use in commercial
enterprises as compared with those sought for individual or personal uses. The
existence of a clear business purpose for seeking a loan seems to be strong
evidence in the lender's favor that the loan was actually made to the corpo-
ration. The manner in which a lender agrees to make a loan remains of
primary importance when the courts seek to determine whether or not to
pierce the corporate veil to find a loan to an individual; so long as the lender
refused to make a loan to an individual the corporate exception statute will
be applied, and the fact that a valid business purpose exists for the loan
seems to be merely additional evidence favoring the lender and not an ab-
solute requirement of the New York courts. 35
The Question-of-Fact Jurisdictions. The courts of other states have taken
a less formalistic view and have attempted to determine whether a loan was
actually made to an individual or to a corporation. The New Jersey courts
opened the door to ignoring the corporate entity in Gelber v. Kugel's Tavern,
Inc., 6 a case which illustrates potential abuses which can occur if a lender
forces a commercially inexperienced individual to incorporate. In Gelber
a lender agreed to make a loan to an individual provided that he incorpo-
rate, which the borrower subsequently did. Upon the corporation's default
on the note the court permitted the individual to whom the loan had been
made in fact to assert the usury defense, holding that it was a question of
fact, to be determined by the jury, whether or not the loan was actually
made to the corporation, or to the individual with the corporation merely in-
terposed as a device to conceal usury.8 7 The difficulty with the approach
adopted in Gelber is that the result is difficult to predict. 38  Therefore, in
such a situation where after-the-fact testimony will be determinative of the
34. See Comment, supra note 31, at 1393.
35. Compare Hoffman v. Lee Nashem Motors, Inc., 20 N.Y.2d 513, 231 N.E.2d
765, 285 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1967) with Leader v. Dinkier Management Corp., 20 N.Y.2d
393, 230 N.E.2d 120, 283 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1967).
36. 10 N.J. 191, 89 A.2d 654 (1952). In Gelber a father wishing to give his son
a business stake in his brother's tavern borrowed a total of $29,000 to purchase the
interest and to refinance the original loan three times. Shockingly, of the $29,000 bor-
rowed by the father the lender exacted $7,200 as a bonus for making the loan.
37. 89 A.2d at 656.
38. The lender in Gelber testified that he told the father that no loans would be
made to individuals, but, that in response to the father's inquiry whether loans were
available to corporations he gave an affirmative answer. The borrower's testimony, on
the other hand, was to the effect that the lender offered him a loan only if he incorpo-
rated, and this was the view which the jury adopted. Id. at 657.
1974]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
issue, lenders must act with caution. While requiring lenders to proceed with
care may be good public policy, if the effect of such a view of the corporate
exception is to stagnate the available supply of money for corporate loans,
especially those for new start-up ventures, then the economic consequences
could be harmful.
New Jersey has continued to conceive the issue as one of fact, the ques-
tion being whether the loan was made to an individual or to a corporation,
so that in appropriate cases the court may ignore the corporate entity when
it appears that the lender has over-reached his borrower. 39  In cases in
which the lender has been informed of the non-business reasons for the loan,
the corporate veil has been pierced and the incorporating borrower permitted
to defend on the ground of usury,40 the corporate exception statute being
held inapplicable. But where there is a finding that the lender refused a
loan to an individual and the individual subsequently created a corporation,
that corporation has been denied the defense of usury, the corporate ex-
ception statute being held to apply. 4' This would seem proper, otherwise
an impossible burden of proof would be placed upon lenders to determine
the motivation underlying the incorporation. So long as the applicant for
a loan is a presently existing corporation, the lender should be permitted
to make that corporation a loan without fear that someone may later chal-
lenge the corporation's identity on the ground that its incorporators intended
to evade the usury law.
The New Jersey courts have not been hostile to a straight-forward use
of the corporate exception to avoid limitations on interest. Monmouth Cap-
ital Corp. v. Holmdel Village Shops, Inc.42 demonstrates that the New Jer-
sey courts will apply the exception statute when an experienced borrower
deliberately uses the statute to obtain a loan. In that case a contractor with
substantial experience needed funds to complete a small shopping center.
Unable to obtain a loan as an individual, he consulted his attorney and a
real estate specialist. Subsequently, his attorney formed a corporation for
him which successfully obtained a loan at a higher interest rate. Upon de-
39. See In re Greenberg, 21 N.J. 213, 121 A.2d 520 (1956). This case demon-
strates the attitude of the courts when there is a clear case of overreaching by a lender.
Greenberg was a disciplinary proceeding in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey
suspended an attorney for a year because while the attorney was forming a "dummy"
corporation to comply with the corporate exception statute he was involved in a conflict
of interests. The lawyer, employed by the lender, not only gave the borrower, an aged
and inexperienced woman, the impression that he was working for her benefit but he
also failed to advise her to seek independent legal advice about the proposed incorpora-
tion. The New Jersey Supreme Court took a very dim view of this attorney's role in
failing to inform the borrower that the reason behind incorporation was to take advan-
tage of the corporate exception statute in order to avoid the usury laws for the lender's
benefit.
40. See Lesser v. Strubbe, 56 N.J. Super. 274, 152 A.2d 409 (1959), rev'd on other
grounds, 67 N.J. Super. 537, 171 A.2d 114 (App. Div. 1961), ajf'd per curiam, 39 N.J.
90, 187 A.2d 705 (1963). The rule which seems to emerge in the question of factjurisdictions is that lenders should know, or pretend to know, as little as possible about
the borrower's motive for seeking a loan. Lenders in such states will probably only
agree to make loans to corporations formed prior to their request for financing.
41. See Corradini v. V. & M. Holding Corp., 34 N.J. Super. 427, 112 A.2d 603(1955).
42. 92 N.J. Super. 480, 224 A.2d 35 (1966).
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fault and foreclosure, the contractor sought to assert the usury defense, urg-
ing that his corporation be ignored as a mere device to avoid the usury law.
The court rejected the usury defense by applying the corporate exception
statute, emphasizing the business purpose for the loan and the fact that the
borrower was advised by counsel, which fact negated the possibility of over-
reaching by the lender. The court also considered the fact that the corpo-
ration had functioned as an entity by paying real estate taxes, entering into
leases, and adopting proper corporate resolutions. 43
The Florida courts likewise have approached the issue of incorporation
to avoid the usury law as a question of fact. Where the lender has agreed
to make a loan to an individual upon the condition that he incorporate, the
courts have pierced the corporate veil and permitted the individual borrower
to assert the usury defense.44 But if the loan was in fact made to a corpora-
tion, the corporate exception statute is applied even though the borrower
created the corporation for the purpose of avoiding the usury law.43  So also,
where the corporation has been in existence for several years prior to the
loan the corporate exception has been applied.4 6
The leading case interpreting the Florida law is Tel Service Co. v. General
Capital Corp.47 The trial court in that case found that the lender had re-
quired a partnership to incorporate before a loan would be made. The trial
court held that the corporate veil should be pierced and the partnership per-
mitted to assert the usury defense. The Florida Supreme Court, however,
reversed on the ground that the mere fact that the lender required incorpora-
tion was insufficient to prove that the loan was in fact made to the partners
as individuals, in light of the fact that the loan agreement was between busi-
nessmen in a business setting. The court emphasized the problem of prov-
ing that the loan was in fact made to the partners as individuals, and indi-
cated that the standard of proof required in order to support such a finding
would be strict.48 As a result of this decision it seems apparent that lenders
in Florida will have a freer hand to suggest incorporation to businessmen
for the purpose of commercial loans payable in Florida.
The Arizona courts recently considered, but regrettably confused, this
area of the law. The opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals in Ganga-
43. Id. at 36-37. This court expressed the fear that if the corporate exception stat-
ute was not applied then every corporate borrower starting a new business venture
would attempt to pierce its corporate veil in an effort to assert the usury defense and
avoid its obligations. Id. at 39.
44. See Gilbert v. Doris R. Corp., 111 So. 2d 682 (Fla. App. 1959), cert. denied,
119 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1960). This court criticized the incorporation device to avoid
the usury law on the ground that the device may aggravate the problem of the neces-
sitous borrower being taken advantage of by a lender. This court pointed out that al-
though the usury law is aimed at preventing abuses by lenders against needy borrow-
ers, the corporate exception statute in the instance of an inexperienced borrower not
only compels him to incorporate to avoid the usury law but also adds the cost of incor-
poration which places him pro tanto further behind financially. Id. at 685.
45. See Holland v. Gross, 89 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1956).
46. See Rosenhouse v. Kimbrig, 147 So. 2d 354 (Fla. App. 1962). The fact that
the borrowing corporation had been in existence for some time prior to the loan is
strong evidence in support of a lender's contention that a loan was intended by all par-
ties to be made to the corporation.
47. 227 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 1969).
48. Id. at 668-70.
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dean v. Flori Investment Co.49 clearly indicated that that court considered
a corporation formed by an individual borrower for the purpose of taking
a loan in the corporation's name to be formed for a valid reason, where
a valid business purpose for seeking the loan existed. The individual in
Gangadean had urged the court to ignore his corporation, formed merely
two days prior to the loan, as a device to avoid the usury law, and hold
that the loan was in fact made to him individually.5 0 The Arizona Court
of Appeals nevertheless held that it was permissible for a borrower to incor-
porate when there existed a valid business purpose for incorporation, and
that seeking a loan for business reasons was such a valid purpose.5 '
The Arizona Supreme Court's opinion upon the appeal in Gangadean52
specifically stated, however, that since the issue of the corporation's being
formed solely as a "dummy" to enable the lender to make a loan to an in-
dividual was not raised the court would express no opinion on that issue.53
This statement seems at odds with the Arizona Court of Appeals opinion,
which indicates that the individual behind the corporate borrower was argu-
ing 'that a loan had been made to him individually. 4 The Supreme Court
of Arizona proceeded to hold that the corporate exception statute should be
applied in this case to deny the corporation the usury defense because the
evidence supported the finding that the loan was to the corporation. The
evidence which was found to be conclusive was that the loan documents
were in the corporate name, that the borrower caused the lender to believe
that the corporation was in existence prior to the loan, and that there was
a clear business purpose for the corporation's borrowing.55
A Trend Toward Expanding the Corporate Exception Statutes. A few
states in recent years have modified their corporate exception statutes in an
attempt to alleviate some of the inherent problems of this area. The corpo-
rate exception statute in Georgia" is particularly well worded to solve the
potential problem of inexperienced borrowers incorporating to avoid the
usury law. Georgia's statute provides a standard which applies the corpo-
rate exception statute only if the corporation is organized for pecuniary gain.
Although there has been no case on point in Georgia interpreting the statu-
tory pecuniary gain standard, in Reynolds v. Service Loan & Finance Co.5"
an appellate court noted that in that case there was no issue of a subterfuge
through incorporation to shield a loan to an individual., When the issue
arises in a Georgia court the statutory language will provide a concrete
49. 11 Ariz. App. 512, 466 P.2d 63 (1970).
50. 466 P.2d at 65, 67.
51. Id. at 68.
52. 106 Ariz. 245, 474 P.2d 1006 (1970) (en banc).
53. 474 P.2d at 1007.
54. See note 50 supra, and accompanying text.
55. 474 P.2d at 1008.
56. See GA. CODE ANN. 57-118 (1971).
57. 116 Ga. App. 740, 158 S.E.2d 309 (1967). This case adopted the majority
rule that the guarantor of a corporate note is within the coverage of the corporate ex-
ception statute and is denied the usury defense along with the corporation.
58. In this case the court stated that there was no possibility that the corporation
was a device to shield a loan to an individual since the corporation involved had been
actively conducting business for three years prior to the loan. 158 S.E.2d at 311.
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guideline by which to resolve the issue of whether the corporation was
formed and the loan obtained with a corporate business purpose in mind.
It would be most difficult to shield loans to individuals or for individuals
to borrow for personal use if there were a requirement for a demonstrable
business reason for the loan. However, such a standard if adopted could
place a heavy burden upon lenders to demonstrate that legitimate business
purposes exist for corporate loans.
Indiana amended its corporate exception statute in 1969 to include part-
nerships, limited partnerships, joint ventures, and trusts within the class of
business enterprises which are denied the defense of usury.59 Almost imme-
diately the Indiana courts were called upon to consider the availability for
use by individuals of the amended exception statute. In Havens v. Wood-
fill 60 a husband and wife, after consultation with a lender, executed a part-
nership agreement, a joint venture agreement, and a trust agreement. Each
of these business entities borrowed one hundred dollars at an interest rate
in excess of the permissible rate for loans to individuals. Shortly after the
loans were made, declaratory judgment actions were commenced to have the
loans declared usurious on the ground that the partnership, joint venture,
and trust agreements were mere shams to enable individuals to obtain loans
by avoiding the usury law. The lender argued that the parties should be
permitted to structure their transactions in such a manner as to take advan-
tage of the expended exception statute in a manner analogous to the Jen-
kins6' rule in New York. The Indiana Court of Appeals rejected the
lender's argument and held that the loans were in fact made to individuals,
and thus were usurious. The court was of the opinion that the partnership,
joint venture, and trust agreements should not be used to circumvent the
usury law, and emphatically refused to recognize the three argeements on
the grounds that to do so would have effectively repealed the usury law.
To the court the form in which the parties cast their transaction was not
controlling; rather it looked to the substance of what they attempted to ac-
complish. 62 The Indiana Legislature subsequently resolved the problem by
repealing all usury laws in that state.63
The State of Washington also recently amended its corporate exception
law along similar lines, providing that the defense of usury is denied to cor-
porations, Massachusetts trusts, associations, limited partnerships, persons
59. See Ch. 106, § 1, [1969] Ind. Acts 248 (codified at IND. STAT. ANN. § 19-12-101
(Bums Cum. Supp. 1970) (repealed 1971)).
60. 148 Ind. App. 366, 266 N.E.2d 221 (1971).
61. See note 28 supra, and accompanying text.
62. 266 N.E.2d at 225. It should be noted that Justice White of that court con-
curred in a separate opinion with the holding that the exception statute was inappli-
cable. He considered that there was a much sounder ground for that decision than
that the transaction was a sham to cover usury. Justice White stated that this was
probably a test case which was not in fact a real controversy. His solution to the prob-
lem was to consider the partnership, joint venture, and trust agreements as unreal due
to the lack of any evidence that the husband and wife were actually engaged in any
business enterprise. To his mind it seemed unsound and unnecessary to encumber the
exception statute with a precedent denying the parties to a commercial loan the option
of intentionally circumventing the general usury law by means of the exception statute
in the situation of a genuine commercial loan to a business enterprise. Id. at 227-28.
63. See Ind. Acts of 1971, P.L. 366 § 10(1).
1974]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
engaged in the business of lending money, and persons developing and im-
proving real estate if the amount of the loan exceeds one hundred thousand
dollars. 64 Although this statute has been interpreted only twice,65 it is sig-
nificant that the Supreme Court of Washington considered one of the legis-
lative reasons for the exception statute to be the fact that businesses, regard-
less of form, do not need the protection of the usury laws. With reference
to real estate developers that court stated: "It is equally reasonable to as-
sume that those engaged in the development and improvement of real estate,
expecting high risks and high returns, should be familiar with financial oper-
ations and money's worth." 66  Georgia has a statute67 similar to the Wash-
ington statute except that the Georgia statute is broader in that it permits
any person, person being defined to include any individual or business en-
tity, to agree in writing to pay any interest rate on loans exceeding one hun-
dred thousand dollars.
It would seem that the trend of these statutes is to allow the businessman
to seek financing at his own risk in the marketplace, regardless of the form
in which he chooses to operate his business. State usury law restrictions
are disadvantageous to businessmen seeking financing in a tight money mar-
ket. But the states which have recognized this fact and enacted corporate
exception statutes have not gone far enough; exceptions should be made for
all businessmen, with the only qualification being that the loan be made for
a valid business purpose.
III. WHICH INTERPRETATION FOR TExAs
In Texas a long history of experimentation with usury provisions has cul-
minated in the basis pattern of a constitutional provision and a series of reg-
ulatory statutes.68 The Texas Constitution dictates the broad rule that in
the absence of legislation fixing maximum rates of interest all contracts for
more than ten percent straight interest per year are usurious.69  The Texas
Consumer Credit Code contains the traditional elements of usury, definition
of interest, and retains the constitution's suggested ten percent limit as the
64. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.52.080 (Supp. 1972).
65. See Federal Shopping Way, Inc. v. O.K. Ins. Agency, Inc., 78 Wash. 2d 903,
481 P.2d 5 (1971); Sparkman & McLean Co. v. Govan Inv. Trust, 78 Wash. 2d 584,
478 P.2d 232 (1970).
66. Sparkman & McLean Co. v. Govan Inv. Trust, 78 Wash. 2d 584, 478 P.2d 232,
236 (1970).
67, See GA. CODE ANN. § 57-119 (1971).
68. In 1869 the Texas Legislature repealed the usury laws and in the constitution
of the same year the legislature was prohibited from enacting usury laws. The consti-
tution enacted in 1876 provided for a usury ceiling of 12% and this was lowered to
the present level of 10% by the constitution adopted in 1891. See Pearce & Williams,
supra note 16, at 235.
69. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, 11 (1891), as amended, (1960).
The legislature shall have authority to classify loans and lenders, license
and regulate lenders, define interest and fix maximum rates of interest;
provided, however, in the absence of legislation fixing maximum rates of
interest all contracts for a greater rate of interest than ten per centum
(10%) per annum shall be deemed usurious; provided, further, that in
contracts where no rate of interest is agreed upon, the rate shall not ex-
ceed six per centum (6%) per annum.
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maximum permissible legal interest rate for individual loans. 70
The Texas corporate exception statute7' is by its terms designed to deny
the defense of usury for loans exceeding five thousand dollars to non-chari-
table and non-religious corporations when the interest rate does not exceed
one and one-half percent per month, or eighteen percent per year. Recog-
nizing that a potential abuse existed, the legislature prudently provided the
eighteen percent per year limit above which a corporation would not be
denied the usury defense. This statute makes the corporate form of enter-
prise an attractive option for lenders and borrowers when the interest rate
approaches the maximum permissible interest rate of ten percent on loans
to individuals. The corporation has in effect a higher interest ceiling which
enables negotiation over a broader spectrum for commercial loans in a tight
money market. Realistically, the corporate exception should be conceived
in functional terms as a privilege for the corporate form of enterprise, that
privilege being the ability to negotiate financing in a tight money market
when others are unable to attract business loans. 72  The higher interest rate
paid by the corporation is a recognition of the risk factor which a lender
assumes when a loan is consummated to finance a business venture. In the
normal situation the corporation through its officers will have a complete
understanding of the loan terms and long range cost, and most importantly,
the corporation does not merely accept the loan, but rather it negotiates with
lenders selected by the corporation with a knowledge of the reputation of
the lender and the market conditions, so that the resultant loan is an arm's-
length transaction. The business corporation also tends to view the loan as
a means of long-term financing which is figured as a cost of doing business.
The Texas courts have not yet faced a situation in which it was necessary
to interpret the Texas corporate exception statute73 in the context of its
70. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (1971).
71. Id. art. 1302-2.09 (Supp. 1974):
Authority of certain corporations to borrow money
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, corporations, domestic orforeign, may agree to and stipulate for any rate of interest as such corpo-
ration may determine, not to exceed one and one-half percent (1 %)
per month, on any bond, note, debt, contract or other obligation of
such corporation under which the original principal amount is Five
Thousand Dollars ($5,000) or more, or on any series of advances of
money pursuant thereto if the aggregate of sums advanced or originally
proposed to be advanced shall exceed Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000),
or on any extention or renewal thereof, and in such instances, the claim
or defense of usury by such corporation, its successors, guarantors, as-
signs or anyone on its behalf is prohibited; however, nothing contained
herein shall prevent any charitable or religious corporation from assert-
ing the claim or interposing the defense of usury in any action or pro-
ceeding.
72. See Hershman, Usury and the Tight Mortgage Market, 22 Bus. LAw. 333(1967). Hershman suggested that the economic effect of a low interest ceiling, such
as in the states having a 6% limit, is that lenders employ their funds in states having
a higher ceiling, thus depleting the money supply for credit in the low ceiling states.
73. See Pearce & Williams, supra note 16, at 254, where they note that there is
a question as to whether the Texas corporate exception will be interpreted as consti-
tutionally permissible legislation fixing a maximum rate of interest. Although the con-
stitutionality of the Texas corporate exception statute has been unquestioned so far, it
would seem that the express wording of the constitution would permit the exception
law in Texas. See also 759 Riverside Ave, Inc. v. Martin, 109 Fla. 473, 147 So. 848
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availability for use by individuals to circumvent the general usury law. They
have, however, given substance to the corporate exception statute by con-
sidering related issues on three occasions. On the first occasion a court
of civil appeals merely determined that the corporate exception was not
retroactive and applied only to loans made after the effective date.74 In
the second case, Sud v. Morris,75 the Beaumont court of civil appeals im-
plied that the corporate exception statute applied to loans made within
Texas and denied the usury defense to Texas corporations. The court found
it unnecessary to interpret the statute to reach its holding that when an in-
dividual and a corporation are co-obligors upon a usurious note the individ-
ual is not denied the defense of usury, even though the corporation is denied
the defense by an exception statute. In Texas Tool Traders v. W.E. Grace
Manufacturing Co.,7 the third reported case involving article 1302-2.09, the
Texas corporate exception statute, the Dallas court of civil appeals held that
the usury penalties of article 5069-1.0677 should be applied to a viola-
tion of the terms of article 1302-2.09 whenever the effective rate of inter-
est exceeded the eighteen percent per year maximum permissible interest
charge to a corporation. According to the Dallas court of civil appeals arti-
cle 5069-1.02 legislates an interest rate of ten percent per year unless other-
wise provided and that article 1302-2.09 otherwise provided for a rate ceiling
of eighteen percent for loans to corporations.7 8
Deliberate Incorporation to Avoid the Texas Usury Law. If the interpreta-
tion of Texas Tool Traders is followed, it would seem that the Texas corpo-
rate exception will be enforced, in which event, sooner or later, a Texas
court will be confronted with a situation where someone has deliberately in-
corporated to avoid the usury laws applicable to individuals.
A Texas court approaching this problem would have a choice between
two basically different approaches. It could adopt the Jenkins rule of New
York sanctioning the deliberate use of the corporate exception to avoid the
usury law, or it could align with one of the question-of-fact jurisdictions. Al-
though both approaches produce the same result when a loan is made to
an individual, that of permitting the usury defense, the two concepts are dis-
similar thereafter. The Jenkins rule permits lenders to refuse loans to in-
(1933); Wm. S. & John H. Thomas, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 251 Mich. 279, 231 N.W.
619 (1930); Snyder v. Woxo, Inc., 185 Neb. 545, 177 N.W.2d 281 (1970) (cases
wherein courts have rejected arguments directed at the constitutionality of state corpo-
rate exception statutes). But see Sullivan v. Securities Inv. Co., 508 P.2d 1077 (Okla.
1972) (express wording of the Oklahoma Constitution preventing the passage of a con-
stitutional exception statute).
74. See Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc. v. Southwestern Inv. Co., 476
S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
75. 492 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973).
76. 488 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972), error granted.
77. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (1971). This article, in § 1,
provides usury penalties of forfeiture of twice the amount of interest charged plus rea-
sonable attorney fees, but makes an exception for accidental errors. Section 2 provides
that the principal of the loan shall be forfeited when the interest charge exceeds double
the amount of interest allowed by law. Section 3 provides a four-year statute of limi-
tations from the date when the usurious charge was collected.
78. 488 S.W.2d at 502,
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dividuals but then suggest that a corporation be created to receive the loan
formally and act as the borrower. The second approach, as used in the
question-of-fact jurisdictions, requires that lenders refuse all usurious loans
to individuals, including situations where a corporation is interposed. Na-
turally, lenders in jurisdictions following the question-of-fact concept can
make loans to corporations; the problems arise where the lender has knowl-
edge that the loan is not for a corporate purpose or that the corporation
is merely a strawman created by an individual.79  If the lender makes a
loan in such a situation it is possible that the question of fact will be resolved
against him and the loan considered to have been made to the individual,
in which case the defense of usury would be available to the lender's detri-
ment. In order to decide which approach is more beneficial the Texas
courts should give consideration to the reasons underlying the two ap-
proaches. The reasons for the first approach are that the letter of the law
denies the usury defense to corporate borrowers, and that the parties to a
loan should be able to negotiate and organize their transactions in the man-
ner they find most beneficial. The second approach is based on the court's
desire to prevent abuse of the exception statute by lenders who may over-
reach their borrowers by forcing them to incorporate. The courts adopt a
question-of-fact approach to determine if the loan was really made to an
individual or to a corporation, thus finding in substance rather than form
whether the corporate exception statute was violated.
It is submitted that the Texas courts should follow the philosophy of the
Jenkins case, in that the approach which allows the parties to incorporate
deliberately to avoid the effects of the usury law is the more practical. The
corporate exception enables corporations to obtain loans for business expan-
sion, and avoiding the usury law in a tight money market is a valid business
consideration to the businessman who is seeking financing. However, since
there is always the possibility that either an inexperienced borrower may at-
tempt to use, or an overreaching lender may attempt to misuse, the corpo-
rate exception statute, it is suggested that two possible remedies exist, each
of which complements the other. First, the courts should recognize only cor-
porations organized for pecuniary gain, as in the Georgia statute, as eligible
for inclusion under the exception statute. Secondly, since the form in which
one does business is frequently merely a formal distinction,80 the legislature
should amend and expand the corporate exception statutes to include other
business forms, similar to the amendments to the Indiana and Washington
statutes.
IV. TAX DIFFICULTIES WITH CORPORATION CREATED TO
AVOID USURY LAWS
The Problem. With the present state of the usury laws, a partnership or
proprietorship virtually may be forced by economic conditions to choose the
79. See notes 36-55 supra, and accompanying text.
80. See Merriman & Hanks, supra note 8, at 12. These authors believe that busi-
nessmen should not have to choose their form of business because of the usury laws,
since other considerations are more important.
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corporate form of enterprise in those states which have an exception statute
to the usury laws limited to corporations. One possible disadvantage of in-
corporation is the double tax which falls upon the corporation and the share-
holder.81 The businessman operating as a proprietor or in partnership may
well prefer the conduit tax treatment of the partnership to the corporate tax,
and may have in fact chosen the partnership specifically for the tax treat-
ment it affords.8 2 The dilemma of whether or not to incorporate to avoid
usury laws is especially critical in real estate development operations, since
real estate developers prefer to operate in partnership form to secure the
favorable flow-through of the tax attributes of specified deductions for in-
terest and depreciation.83 A partnership which incorporates to take advan-
tage of the corporate exception statutes because of a need to obtain financ-
ing may desire to retain the conduit tax treatment available to the partner-
ship but not the corporation. Through careful tax planning it is possible
that the incorporating partnership or proprietorship may achieve both objec-
tives.
Whenever a corporation is organized to receive a conveyance of the legal
title, while the equitable title remains in its incorporators, the courts have
been willing to ignore the corporation for tax purposes.8 4  However, when
the least indication of a business activity on the legal title-holding corpora-
tion's part has been demonstrated, the courts have invariably taxed the cor-
poration as a separate and viable entity. The cases indicate that any activ-
ity other than holding bare legal title is sufficient to trigger taxability of the
corporation. 85 A solution to the problem of forming a corporation to avoid
the usury law and attempting to retain conduit tax treatment is not offered
by ignoring the corporate entity for tax purposes, since the corporation must
act as the borrower and become primarily liable on the loan. If the corpo-
ration borrows and executes promissory notes, the tax consequence is that
it will be recognized as a taxable entity as it is demonstrating some business
81. See B. BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 1.03 (1971). The double taxation occurs because the corporation is first
taxed upon its income and then the shareholders are taxed upon corporate distributions
to them in their capacity as shareholders.
82. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 701-71.
83. Id. §§ 163, 167. See also Merriman & Hanks, supra note 8, at 11. It should
be noted that the subchapter S, small corporation election is generally unavailable to
real estate developers due to the restriction of that option to corporations which receive
less than 20% of their business income from passive investments such as rent. INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, § 1382(e) (5).
84. See Shaw Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1963); United
States v. Brager Bldg. & Land Corp., 124 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1941).
85. See Taylor v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1971) (corporation col-
lected revenue, executed deeds, mortgages, and contracts, and borrowed); Britt v.
United States, 431 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1970) (corporation was a partner, paid taxes,
paid attorney and accountant fees, and entered into all partnership documents as a sign-
ing party); Tomlinson v. Miles, 316 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
828 (1963) (corporation acquired land, recorded title, surveyed the land, and sold tim-
ber); Hagist Ranch Inc. v. Commissioner, 295 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1961) (corporation
executed leases and bought and sold property); O'Neill v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 44(9th Cir. 1959) (corporation executed notes and mortgages); Skarda v. Commissioner,
250 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1957) (corporation received dividends and served purpose of
holding title during merger plan); Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir.
1945) (corporation borrowed and was recognized; but another corporation which
merely held bare legal title to land was ignored).
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activities which are the criterion of taxability. The theory of treating a cor-
poration as a passive "dummy" will be given effect for tax purposes, accord-
ing to the First Circuit, when the corporation "only performed those trans-
actions necessary to the holding and transferring of title."8 6  Because bor-
rowing and the execution of debt instruments are functions other than those
merely necessary to holding title, it seems that the creation of a corporation
to avoid the usury laws will not achieve the desired objective of conduit tax
treatment on the basis of ignoring the corporate entity for tax purposes.
Another Approach-The Use of a Corporate Agent. Another approach,
that of creating an agency or trust relationship between a corporation hold-
ing legal title to property and the equitable title holders appears more prom-
ising as a solution towards achieving conduit tax treatment for a partnership
which incorporates to avoid the usury laws.8 7 The key concept underlying
this approach is an analogy to the traditional agency rule that an agent may
hold the bare legal title for his principal who holds the equitable or bene-
ficial interest. An agent is properly taxed upon compensation paid him by
his principal for services rendered, but not upon income collected by him
on behalf of, and distributed to, his principal.88 To succeed in using an
agency approach all incidents of an agency relationship must be present be-
tween the agent corporation, whose agency functions are to borrow and hold
bare legal title to the property, and the principal who holds equitable title
and desires the use of the borrowed funds.89 The advantage of an agency
or trust relationship is that it allows the agent or trustee corporation to per-
form the ministerial duties which are essential if the corporation is to borrow
and execute a mortgage to assure the lender of security. 90
The historical antecedents for the agency approach originated in Moline
Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner,91 where the United States Supreme Court
86. See Taylor v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 455, 457 (1st Cir. 1971). The taxpay-
ers who were the shareholders of the corporation which was seeking to be ignored for
tax purposes had conducted their business as if the corporation did not exist. Even
though the stockholders ignored their corporation the First Circuit taxed the corpora-
tion for its minimal business activities.
87. See Tilley, supra note 4.
88. See Kurtz & Kopp, supra note 4, at 648-49.
89. See id. at 647-48, wherein the authors suggest several reasons why the owner
of property may wish to have title held by an agent or strawman. These include the
limitation of liability of the equitable title holder, the securing of anonymous owner-
ship, the simplification of conveyancing, and the avoidance of title problems on the
death of the owner. These authors point out that an individual may serve as a straw-
man to hold title but that an individual strawman has the disadvantages of creating
contract liability against the title he holds, and that he may die, causing title problems,
whereas use of a corporation avoids these problems.
90. See Tilley, supra note 4, at 450, where it is said that the agency or trust ap-
proach is the only theory possible when the corporation is to be the borrower in order
to avoid the usury law, because the activities of the corporation constitute business ac-
tivities which normally result in the imposition of the corporate tax.
This treatment is analogous to the situation where individuals are used as nominees
to hold bare legal title by the beneficial owners of property. In such a situation the
nominee can borrow and mortgage the property in his capacity as the agent or trustee
for the equitable title owner.
91. 319 U.S. 436 (1943). In this case the Supreme Court enunciated a rather
vague test for determining whether a corporation could be considered passive for tax
purposes:
The doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in business life.
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held that a corporate entity could not be ignored for tax purposes. However,
in that case the Court in support of its decision to recognize the corporation
as a taxable entity commented that there was neither an agency contract
nor the incidents of an agency relationship between the corporation and its
sole shareholder.9 2  In a later case, National Carbide Corp. v. Commis-
sioner,93 the Supreme Court set out the test for determining if an agency
existed: "If the Corporation is a true agent, its relations with its principal
must not be dependent upon the fact that it is owned by the principal, if
such is the case. Its business purpose must be the carrying on of the nor-
mal duties of an agent."'9 4
The Tax Court in two early cases 95 established precedents sanctioning this
approach when there were specific contracts and corporate resolutions ex-
plaining that the corporation was merely holding title as an agent or trustee.
Although the Tax Court has been very strict with the passive concept by
refusing to ignore corporations whenever there was a showing of any busi-
ness activity96 or business objective for incorporation, 97 it has on occasion
permitted an agency or trust approach. In Caswal Corp.9 8 the Tax Court
permitted a corporation which was created and acted solely as a trustee to
deduct all rental income which it distributed to the beneficiaries of the ex-
Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the law of the state
of incorporation or to avoid or to comply with the demands of creditors
or to serve the creator's personal or undisclosed convenience, so long as
that purpose is the equivalent of business activity or is followed by the
carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains a
separate taxable entity.
Id. at 438-39.
92. Id. at 440. The Supreme Court noted that the mere fact a corporation existed
did not make that corporation the agent of its shareholders.
93. 336 U.S. 422 (1949). In National Carbide the Supreme Court considered the
contention by a parent corporation that an agency agreement existed between the par-
ent and three of its subsidiaries. The parent corporation's argument was premised upon
a contract executed between the parent and the three subsidiaries. This contract pro-
vided that in consideration for the parent corporation's investment of capital and man-
agement assistance the subsidiaries would pay all but a small fraction of their profits
to the parent. The Supreme Court rejected the notion that any agency existed, because
there was no proof of a true agency. In the Supreme Court's opinion the contract was
consistent and referable to the parent-to-subsidiary relationship, regardless of the
agency issue. As a result of the Court's refusal to consider the arrangement an agency,
the three subsidiaries were taxed as separate corporate entities. National Carbide did
not foreclose the possibility of the agency approach, however, for the Supreme Court
noted that if a true corporate agent were used it would not be taxed upon the property
and income of the principal which it received.
94. Id. at 437.
95. See Industrial Union Oil Co., 5 T.C.M. 879 (1946), holding that a corporation
holding legal title was not taxable on income from oil leases, and Worth S.S. Corp.,
7 T.C. 654 (1946), holding that a corporation which operated a ship as legal title
holder for a joint venture was not taxable on the income collected for the beneficial
owners. This result was accomplished by the use of a joint venture agreement, an op-
eration agreement, and a declaration of trust.
96. See Perry R. Bass, 50 T.C. 595 (1968) (corporation signed contracts and made
investments). But see, Bartell Hotel Co., 32 T.C. 311 (1959) (corporation holding
title to hotel operated by other corporation not taxed on hotel earnings).
97. See Sam Siegel, 45 T.C. 566 (1966) (corporation formed for the bona fide
business purpose of obtaining limited liability for a risky foreign investment).
98. 19 T.C.M. 757 (1960). See also K-C Land Co., 19 T.C.M. 183 (1960). In
this case the Tax Court held a similar trust agreement effective to prevent the imposi-
tion of a tax upon the income collected by the corporate trustee on behalf of its benefi-
cial owners engaged in a joint venture.
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press trust. Further, the activities of the corporation were holding bare legal
title, managing the property in trust, collecting the rents on the trust prop-
erty, and distributing the income to the beneficiaries. To the Tax Court
these activities were consistent with the trust relationship and did not evi-
dence business activity that would indicate that the corporation was acting
on behalf of itself, rather than as trustee.
Although these early cases suggest that an agency or trust theory may
permit a corporation to perform ministerial functions and still, as in the ex-
ample of an individual agent, have the income it collects on behalf of its
principal taxed to the beneficial owners, there remain substantial difficul-
ties for the taxpayer seeking to create an agent corporation.
Carver v. United States99 indicated that a proper agency approach is feas-
ible. In that case an attorney employed a shell corporation to aid his clients
and to further some if his own enterprises. The Commissioner sought to
tax the corporate entity for those transactions which had been conducted
on behalf of the attorney as the sole owner of the corporation. The Com-
missioner did not challenge the use of the corporation as an agent for the
attorney's clients. The transaction in Carver involved a situation in which
the attorney and one of his clients, acting together as joint venturers, bor-
rowed money to purchase realty, the title to which they nominally placed
in the corporation for holding purposes. Twenty years later when the land
was sold and the corporation liquidated the Court of Claims refused to im-
pose the corporate tax on the gain from the sale of the land because, al-
though the attorney was the sole owner of the corporation, the relationship
between the third party to the transaction, the attorney's client, and 'the cor-
poration was clearly that of principal and agent.100 Because of the agency
relationship, the Court of Claims permitted the taxpayer attorney to include
the gain on the sale of the land in this particular transaction on his individual
tax return and not the corporation's return. Thus, the attorney was allowed
to treat the corporation as his agent because the evidence that the corpora-
tion had acted in a similar manner for an independent third party tended
to prove the existence of a true agency relationship.
The Court of Claims continued to utilize the Carver mode of analysis in
the recent case of Harrison Property Management Co. v. United States,1°1
in which three partners incorporated a management company to hold bare
legal title to oil leases for the purpose of providing efficient management
in the event of the death of one of the partners. The stockholders of the
corporation, the three partners, attempted to arrange their transaction to
qualify the corporation as an agent by limiting the activities which it could
undertake and requiring unanimous approval of all three directors, also the
three partners, for most corporate actions. The partners also executed an
99. 412 F.2d 233 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
100. Id. at 240.
101. 475 F.2d 623 (Ct. Cl. 1973). The Court of Claims first noted that the corpo-
ration could not be treated as a passive entity which could be ignored for tax purposes
because it was organized for business convenience and it performed business activities
in executing leases, selling produce, entering lawsuits, and holding stockholder meetings.
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agreement which recited that the corporation was organized solely to man-
age and hold title to property. The Court of Claims rejected the contention
that this arrangement was sufficient to establish the corporation as a mere
corporate agent for tax purposes. Instead of considering the purported
agency contract to be controlling for tax purposes the court sought to find
evidence of the substance of an agency. 10 2 In an attempt to find the sub-
stance of an agency relationship the court inquired into whether the agency
contract was an arm's-length bargain between the corporation and the three
stockholders, the partners who also held the beneficial interest. Two criteria
were considered significant in this inquiry; first, would the agent-corporation
have made the contract if not owned by the stockholder-beneficial owners,
and second, would the stockholder-beneficial owners have made the contract
if the corporate agent were not under their control. 103 The Court of Claims
pointed to the Carver case as an instance where these criteria were satisfied.
In Carver the corporation acted on behalf of an independent third party in
the same manner as it did for its sole owner. By acting for the independent
third party, the corporation demonstrated that its relationship with its owner
was actually that of agency, and not merely dependent upon ownership and
control by the owner-principal. In reaching its decision that -the manage-
ment company was not a true corporate agent and therefore taxable on its
receipts, the court noted that the criterion of whether the corporation and
the beneficial owner would have executed the agency contract in the ab-
sence of ownership by the beneficial owners of the corporation had to be
answered in the negative.
To satisfy the requirements of the criteria enunciated in Harrison Prop-
erty Management Co. it is evident that the corporation should not appear
to function solely because it is owned by the principal. Convincing evidence
that the corporate agent is independent of its principal must be available
to demonstrate that it is in fact an agent. In theory, the more independent
the nominee corporation is of the principal-owners, the greater the likelihood
that the agency relationship will be recognized as controlling. One of the
factors that indicates the existency of a true agency relationship is the ade-
quacy of the consideration received by the agent corporation in return for
the performance of the ministerial acts of an agent. Thus, a mere nominal
fee paid to the corporation by the principals suggests that the corporation
is not a true agent. But if the corporation receives a fee which includes
its costs plus a profit element, then there is stronger evidence that a true
agency exists since the corporation would be operating like any other busi-
ness agent, receiving a commission for services rendered. Another critical
factor in establishing an agency relationship is that there should be a very
specific agency contract between the principals and the agent corporation,
102. Id. at 629 n.3. The court questioned whether the language of the contract ac-
tually established a formal agency.
103. Id. at 627-28. The court considered significant the facts that the corporation
was organized solely to serve its stockholders, that the corporation needed the unani-
mous consent of all three director-stockholders to take most corporate action, and that
the relation between corporation and beneficial owners was dependent upon the benefi-
cial owners being the sole stockholders.
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setting forth in detail all the normal incidents of an agency, including the
power of the principal to terminate the agency at any time by demanding
a reconveyance of the legal title. The agent-corporation should be restricted
through its articles of incorporation and bylaws to the performance of minis-
terial acts consistent with an agency relationship in order to demonstrate that
the agent corporation is not, in fact, engaging in business for itself. If per-
sons other than the principals owned and managed the agent corporation
in consideration for the commission paid the corporation, this would seem
even more convincing evidence of a true agency. Thus, the agent corpora-
tion's actions would not be directly controlled by the principals, and yet the
principals would be protected by their agency contract permitting a revoca-
tion of the agency upon demand for a reconveyance of legal title. 04
Taxpayer Mistakes to Avoid. In planning the organization of an agent cor-
poration some consideration should be given to the fact that the corporation
should appear to be an agent from its inception. The Tax Court has found
that corporations, which taxpayers claim to be agents, are not in fact agents
because they were organized with an intent to conduct business. Actual
business activity should be kept to an absolute minimum of ministerial acts
which would not lead to a finding that the corporation was operating as a
business corporation.
In the recent Tax Court case of David F. Bolger'°5 a series of financing
corporations, formed in order to obtain maximum financing by avoiding the
usury law by stockholders who would eventually receive title to real estate
acquired by the corporations, were recognized as taxable entities. The
transactions in which these ten financing corporations played a significant
role were factually complex. Each corporation purchased a building and
then leased it to some business firm on a long-term net lease basis. The
corporations then obtained loans from institutional lenders -to pay for the
purchased buildings. Each loan was obtained by the execution of the cor-
poration's mortgage notes and an assignment of the long-term net lease.
The corporations agreed with the lender that they would conduct no business
other than the leasing of the purchased property and that they would con-
tinue to exist during the term of the mortgage notes bought by the lender.
The shareholders of the corporation then entered into an assumption agree-
ment with the corporations by which the corporations agreed to convey the
104. See Tilley, supra note 4, at 451-53, for a complete list of suggestions about
forming the agent corporation. Tilley noted that the most difficult problem is forming
the agent corporation so that there is adequate proof of an agency relationship.
See, e.g., Dave Stillman, 60 T.C. 897 (1973). In this case the Tax Court determined
that there was no actual agency relationship, primarily because the corporation was
found to have been organized to conduct business. The taxpayers in Stillman were
partners who incorporated a development company and later, when they found them-
selves unable to finance their project, by a corporate resolution, caused the development
corporation to declare itself an agent for the partners.
105. 59 T.C. 760 (1973), on appeal, (3d Cir., Aug. 13, 1973). The Tax Court
noted that, aside from the issue of an agency, the 'business activity of each corporation
in purchasing property, executing mortgages, making and assigning leases, and borrow-
ing money through the sale of its corporate obligations were sufficient to require recog-
nition of the corporation as an entity for tax purposes.
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land to the shareholders, who agreed in turn to assume all obligations under
the lease and mortgage 'but without becoming personally liable on the mort-
gage.
The result of this carefully conceived financing scheme was that the share-
holders, the taxpayers in the suit, received legal title to the properties, which
were encumbered by a lease and a mortgage, without making a cash invest-
ment. On the issue of whether an agency relationship existed between the
stockholders and the straw financing corporations, the Tax Court noted that
in only two of the ten corporation's documents was there language indicative
of an agency. 10 Since the taxpayer asserted that none of the corporations
should be recognized for tax purposes, the Tax Court rejected the agency
contention because of the lack of proof of an agency. Bolger should rein-
force the suggestion made earlier that all corporate documents be drafted
to indicate specifically and affirmatively the existence of an agency, and that
there should be an agency contract between the corporation and the prin-
cipals.
Potential Conflict Between Usury Laws and the Agent-Borrower. The Bol-
ger case highlighted an area of potential conflict between the agency ap-
proach in tax law and the usury law interpretations of the corporate excep-
tion statutes under state law. The Tax Court in Bolger stated that "[t]he
existence of an agency relationship would have been self-defeating in that
it would have seriously endangered, if not prevented, the achievement of
those objectives which, in large part, gave rise to the use of the corporations,
namely, the avoidance of restrictions under State laws.' 107 The restrictions
referred to by the Tax Court were the usury laws. The taxpayer in Bolger
was a resident of New Jersey which follows the question-of-fact approach
to the usury law. By the question-of-fact interpretation the lender is ex-
posed to the risk that an individual will be permitted to assert the usury
defense and ignore his corporation if the lender had knowledge at the time
the loan was made that the loan was to an individual. It is clear from Bol-
ger that the lending institutions which financed these transactions probably
knew of all steps in the entire transaction, although a lender would be wise
to pretend ignorance of any transactions between a corporate borrower and
its shareholders. It is most unfortunate that the Tax Court did not elabo-
rate on its statement that the use of the agency approach would destroy the
transaction from the viewpoint of the state usury laws.
Harmonizing Usury Law and the Corporate Agent Approach. In those ju-
risdictions which permit the deliberate use of the corporate exception statute
to avoid the usury law there should be no problem if the lender knows that
the corporate borrower is an agent. However, the agency approach could
be subject to substantial risks in those states which do not permit the deliber-
ate use of the corporate exception. If the lender has knowledge of the bor-
rower's individual identity, it would furnish the grounds for a court to pierce
106. Id. at 766 n.3.
107. Id. at 766.
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the corporation's veil and permit the usury defense on the theory that the
loan was in fact to an individual. 10 8
As a matter of business functioning in the practical rather than the legal
sense it should be irrelevant whether or not the lender knows that the cor-
porate-borrower is merely an agent. But cautious legal planning designed
to assure the lender that the borrower will not be able to pierce its corporate
veil and assert the usury defense should include the consideration that in
a state following the question-of-fact approach to the corporate usury excep-
tion the lender should know as little as possible about the dealings between
the corporate-borrower and its shareholders. This consideration would dic-
tate to the cautious lender that he abort an incompletely negotiated loan to
a corporate borrower if that borrower volunteered the information that there
was an agency relationship between itself and its shareholders.
An alternative solution which may be safer from the usury standpoint,
although it may occasion more effort and expenses, is for the borrower to
seek a loan in another state by employing the applicable rules of the con-
flict of laws to obtain an advantage under that state's law.'0 9 A borrower
considering such a conflicts approach would have to select a state where
there was a favorable advantage over his own state's usury law, and locate
an agreeable lender in that state. But this would not be difficult. A bor-
rower could have his choice of several states which have no usury law at
all, 110 or a state which has enacted an expanded usury exception statute,"'
or a state which has a corporate exception statute and courts following the
Jenkins rule of New York. For the Texas borrower there is recent prece-
dent indicating that this conflicts approach is feasible. In Securities Invest-
ment Co. v. Finance Acceptance Corp.1 2 the Houston court of civil appeals
held that the Missouri law would be applied as between a Missouri lender
and a Texas corporate borrower where the contract between them was exe-
cuted in Missouri, the contract specified the Missouri law, the lender had
no office in Texas, and the receivables securing the loan were forwarded
to the lender's place of business in Missouri. 1" The Houston court of civil
appeals also held that under Texas' conflict of laws rules a reasonable rela-
tion between the contract and the law of Missouri existed, thereby requiring
the application of the law of Missouri's corporate exception statute, which
denied the Texas corporate borrower a cause of action for recovery of usury
penalties in the absence of the payment of the principal and interest on the
loan.114
V. CONCLUSION
The general usury law can make borrowing money difficult for the busi-
108. See notes 36-55 supra, and accompanying text.
109. See Comment, supra note 31, at 395-97, for a review of the rules which suggest
that the conflict of laws approach will be effective if the documents are well drawn.
110. Maine, Massachusetts, and Indiana presently have no usury laws.
111. See, e.g., the Washington and Georgia statutes at notes 64, 67 supra, and ac-
companying text.
112. 474 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
113. Id. at 272.
114. Id. at 271.
1974]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
nessman when there exists a tight money market in which interest rates ap-
proach the legal maximum under state law. In those states which have en-
acted corporate exception statutes, the businessman has a viable option to
incorporate and thus become a more attractive borrower to lenders. The
corporate exception statutes, however, should be broadened to include other
forms of business enterprises; choice of the form of business should not be
circumscribed by state usury laws. In normal commercial situations courts
have had no difficulty in giving effect to corporate exception statutes be-
cause either the corporate borrower was in existence at the time when the
loan was contracted or else the corporation involved clearly borrowed for
a business reason. Problems have arisen only when the corporate exception
statute has been abused, particularly when a lender has required a commer-
cially inexperienced individual to incorporate as a condition to securing a
loan. To avoid such abuse, which would render usury laws a nullity, the
law distinguishes in the first instance between loans made to corporations
and loans made to individuals. Some states allow the participants to a loan
transaction to discuss openly the use of the corporate exception statute,
whereas in states which adopt the question-of-fact approach the lender is
subject to the risk that the usury defense may be entertained if the lender
knows that an individual is deliberately employing the corporate exception
statute to obtain a loan. As between these two approaches the former is
preferable as being the more realistic and practical. It permits businessmen
to organize their transactions upon the basis of business considerations rather
than upon the basis of the usury law.
When forming a corporation to avoid the adverse effects of state usury
laws the prospective borrower should consider carefully the tax consequences
which will result from creating such a corporation. If the businessman can
advantageously operate from the corporate form then no unusual tax com-
plications are likely to occur. However, if the businessman is in the limited
category of persons, such as real estate developers, who find that the conduit
tax treatment of partnerships is especially advantageous then great care must
be taken to assure continued conduit treatment. An agency relationship ap-
pears to be the best approach available as a mechanism to achieve conduit
tax treatment for the individual who creates a corporation as a means of
employing a corporate exception statute to avoid the effects of the usury
law. If this corporation is in fact an agent there is no reason that it should
not be taxed as one, thus causing income collected on behalf of its principals
to be taxed to the principal under the conduit tax treatment of principals
and their agents.
'Unfortunately, at the present time, uniformity between results of state
usury law requirements and the tax consequences of the formation of a cor-
poration to avoid state usury laws does not exist. This lack of clarity could
be solved by specific Treasury regulations or rulings which would enable
practitioners in this area to proceed with certainty, or at least reasonable guid-
ance. Perhaps the simplest and most direct solution to the entire problem
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would be for state legislatures to repeal all usury laws. However, a similar
result could be achieved 'by a more modest change occasioned by broaden-
ing the scope of corporate exception statutes by amendment to include all
bona fide business entities. In states which have amended their exception
statutes to include many business entities the tax law and the usury law are
in accord; the businessman need not change his business form to satisfy a
limited exception statute and, thus, the tax consequence of his choice of busi-
ness organization remains unaffected.
